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NOTE 
The Law Review Divide: A Study of Gender Diversity on the Top Twenty Law Reviews 
Lynne N. Kolodinsky 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 A highlight of the summer following my first year at Cornell Law School was receiving 
an invitation to become an associate member of the Cornell Law Review.  I was thrilled and 
honored to accept this invitation, which symbolized the pinnacle of first-year law school success 
and quite literally opened doors to interview rooms at the annual Cornell job fair that August. 
 Not long after distributing invitations, the Cornell Law Review released a complete list of 
the new associates for the upcoming 2012–13 academic year, and I noticed immediately that 
only fourteen of the forty-two new associates were women.  I was not alone in observing this—
within minutes of the list being published, a friend and fellow law review member contacted me 
to ask whether I would, as president of my school’s women’s affinity group at that time, issue a 
public written statement decrying this apparent underrepresentation of women on the law 
review.
1
  Although I shared my friend’s surprise, I did not feel I had anything to decry because 
the law review’s admissions process seemed fair and transparent.  To my knowledge, exams 
were graded anonymously and writing competitions were scored blindly, and the resultant grade-
point averages and writing scores were then paired and ranked by an impartial administrative 
assistant.  I perceived no inherent unfairness in the process; instead, it appeared to me that 
women in my class had—for unknown reasons—simply not fared as well as men in the Cornell 
Law Review admissions process. 
                                                 
1
  My conclusion that fourteen out of forty-two signaled underrepresentation was based 
on an assumption that women comprised more than half of the applicant pool.  For an in-depth 
discussion of women’s law school enrollment rates and possible problems with using these rates 
in statistical analysis, see infra discussion Part II.B. 
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 It was not long before I learned that this apparent and unexplained gender disparity in law 
review membership is not unique to Cornell Law School.
2
  I describe the disparity as both 
apparent and unexplained because although a number of scholarly articles and essays mention 
this disparity or analyze some segment of it, no scholarship yet provides a thorough examination 
and analysis of how law review admissions processes affect the gender diversity of law review 
membership, if in fact they affect gender diversity at all.  The uncertain effect of the law review 
admissions process on law review gender diversity led me to reflect more deeply on my friend’s 
goading remark and wonder whether there might be something in the process to decry.   
My goal in this Note is to objectively analyze the gender disparity on law reviews and 
begin exploring possible explanations for that disparity.  In pursuit of this goal, I present 
independently reported and verified data on law review membership at the top-twenty ranked 
law reviews over the past five academic years (2008–09 through 2012–13), run a comprehensive 
statistical analysis of that data, and discuss my findings from this statistical analysis.  Finally, I 
aim to begin a discussion of possible explanations for these findings by situating my study within 
the realm of existing scholarship on women in the law.   
I understand the tension often inherent in diversity issues and, more importantly, I 
understand that law reviews value and treat diversity in different ways.  For these reasons, I do 
not purport to draw any normative conclusions in this Note.  Furthermore, I do not write this 
Note through the lens of any particular theory of feminist discourse;
3
 to the contrary, I have 
                                                 
2
 Jennifer C. Mullins & Nancy Leong, The Persistent Gender Disparity in Student Note 
Publication, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385, 397 (2011). 
3
 Much of the scholarship on women in the law, like much of feminist scholarship in 
general, may be classified under the headings of two main theories: the “equality” theory and the 
“difference” theory.   The equality theory, propelled forward by feminists as early as Mary 
Wollstonecraft in 1792,
 
see MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN, Chap. IX (Boston: Peter Edes 1792), emphasizes the similarities between women and 
3 
 
taken care to collect and analyze my data as objectively as possible because my goal is to 
promote an advanced understanding of law review membership rather than any particular 
feminist agenda.
4
  I hope simply that my work will contribute to the ongoing inquiry into law 
review gender diversity by enhancing a collective understanding of the relationship between a 
law review’s admissions process and its gender diversity.  This, in turn, will ideally assist all law 
reviews in deciding how to achieve their ideal diversity balances, regardless of what those 
balances might be. 
                                                                                                                                                             
men as grounds on which to base equal treatment and respect of the sexes.  Fundamentally at 
odds with the equality theory is the difference theory, a more recently developed feminist 
movement that stresses the differences between women and argues that “discrimination and 
different patterns of gender socialization are relevant to considerations of women’s employment 
and education.” STEVEN SEIDMAN, THE POSTMODERN TURN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL 
THEORY 19 (1994). 
 Viewing women’s experiences in law school too exclusively through either an equality 
lens or a difference lens may be disadvantageous to women’s advancement.  On one end, sheer 
equal treatment of women and men in the law school classroom may be an insufficient response 
to women’s discontent, either because it makes “man . . . the measure of all things,” Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 (1987), or because an “equal” experience may be undesirable 
in other ways by both women and men alike, see, e.g., Banu Ramachandran, Re-Reading 
Difference: Feminist Critiques Of The Law School Classroom And The Problem With Speaking 
From Experience, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1774 (Nov. 1998) (citations omitted) (“For instance, 
Kingsfield, the much-feared contracts professor in The Paper Chase, might have treated all his 
students equally, but few would find the manner in which he treated students to be desirable.”).  
On the other hand, difference theory “tends to obscure differences among women, and perhaps, 
ultimately, tends to reproduce the exclusions of the larger society.”  Ramachandran, supra. 
 
4
 My approach aligns most closely with gender historian Joan Scott’s focus on the 
critical importance of understanding institutions in order to best understand what change is 
needed, if any, and how best to effectuate that change:  
The emphasis on “how” suggests a study of processes, not of 
origins, of multiple rather than single causes, of rhetoric or 
discourse rather than ideology or consciousness.  It does not 
abandon attention to structures or institutions, but it does insist that 
we need to understand what these organizations mean in order to 
understand how they work.
 
  
JOAN W. SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 63 (Columbia University 
Press rev. ed. 1999) 
4 
 
 Part I provides background information on women in law schools, including a brief 
history of women in the legal profession, women’s experiences in law school today, and a sketch 
of current legal scholarship on women’s issues in legal education.  This history is an integral part 
of any possible explanation for why women’s law school experiences might differ from men’s 
because the traditionally male-dominated nature of legal education and culture will doubtless 
continue to have a lingering impact on women in the profession.  Furthermore, a broad 
understanding of women’s law school experiences contributes to an understanding of narrower 
pieces of those experiences, including law review membership.  This Part then situates my Note 
within the developing realm of legal scholarship on women in law not as advocacy of any 
particular theory, but rather as a means of understanding how certain processes, including law 
review selection, contribute to women’s contemporary law school experiences.5 
Part II describes my method of data collection and analysis.  This Part begins with a brief  
overview of my methodology.  I also provide the rationale for the scope of my study, which 
covers the past five years’ membership of the top twenty law reviews in the Washington & Lee 
University Law Library Law Review Rankings.  I describe in turn each of my four major data 
sources—(1) masthead collection, (2) school enrollment data, (3) publicly available information 
on law reviews’ admissions processes, and (4) solicited qualitative data from editors-in-chief of 
law reviews—and my approach to compiling data from these sources.   
Part III describes my data and factual findings.  I begin by presenting my general finding 
that over the past five years across all twenty schools in my study, women are statistically 
underrepresented members of law reviews.  Critically, this gender disparity does not exist at each 
of the twenty schools, and the severity of the disparity varies quite widely among the schools at 
                                                 
5
   See id. 
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which it does exist.  I explore these differences by running a two-sample t-test on each school.  
The results of these tests show that although the gender disparity in law review membership is 
sufficiently pervasive to create an overall gender disparity across the top twenty law reviews, the 
gender disparity is not by any means universal. 
Part IV is a discussion of my data, including possible explanations for the gender 
disparity where it exists and the importance of my study in the greater scheme of women’s 
participation in law schools and the legal profession.  I focus my discussion on the non-
universality of the disparity to support my theory that despite a woman’s ability to succeed in 
law school and on law review to the same extent as a man, women are affirmatively self-
selecting out of the process and choosing to prioritize other parts of their lives.  
Part V is a Conclusion that summarizes the significance of my Note and shares ideas for 
future studies on this topic. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. A Brief Overview of Women’s Advancement in the Legal Profession 
For many years, the idea that a woman might practice law was unthinkable.  Women 
remained “civilly dead and without political rights” for years after the American Revolution,6 
and Thomas Jefferson wrote during his presidential tenure that women’s education should be 
limited to “the amusements of life . . . dancing, drawing, and music.”7  Half a century later, 
Justice Bradley echoed these sentiments in Bradwell v. Illinois, the landmark Supreme Court 
case that upheld Illinois’ right to deny a woman admission to the state bar on the basis of her sex, 
                                                 
6
  BETTINA APTHEKER, WOMEN’S LEGACY: ESSAYS ON RACE, SEX, AND CLASS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 16 (University of Massachusetts Press 1982).  
7
  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nathaniel Burwell (Mar. 14, 1818), in 12 THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1816–1826 (New York and London, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, Fed. Ed. 
1905), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3F 
title=808&chapter=88372&layout=html&Itemid=27. 
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stating that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother.” 8  Although several government-supported universities began 
to offer women admission after the Civil War, women remained unable to practice law without a 
court-granted license until Arabella Babb Mansfield became the first woman in the nation to win 
bar admission in June 1869.
9
  After Mansfield’s bar admission, Myra Bradwell earned her 
legendary reputation as “the pioneer woman lawyer” by working to further women’s ability to 
gain law school and state bar admission at the end of the nineteenth century.
10
 
 Despite this early progress, women applying to law schools faced tremendous resistance 
and ridicule until only recently.
11
  Even after Congress approved women’s suffrage in June 1919, 
twenty-seven law schools—including several of the nation’s most elite law schools12—continued 
to refuse women admission.  At the same time, women long continued to self-select out of law 
school in order to avoid the additional and greater challenge of securing legal employment after 
graduation.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the second woman to ever be appointed a United States 
Supreme Court Justice and one of only nine women in Harvard Law School’s 1956 entering 
class of 500, articulated the struggle in the following manner: “Why were there so few women in 
                                                 
8
 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
9
  See HEDDA GARZA, BARRED FROM THE BAR: A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (1996), available at http://www.naderlibrary.com/lit.barredbar.1.htm.  Mansfield 
won her bar admission in Iowa state.  See id. 
10
  See id.; see also Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Folst: First Woman, 28 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1231, 1266 & n.155 (1994) (describing Bradwell as the “most celebrated of 
early women lawyers” and highlighting several of Bradwell’s significant accomplishments). 
11
  See GARZA, supra note 9.    
12
  See id. Among the elite law schools, Yale Law School first admitted one woman in 
1918 and five more in 1919, but Columbia Law School and Harvard Law School remained 
resistant for a number of additional years. 
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law school a generation ago?  It was the sense that, well, I can go through three years of law 
school and then what?  Who will hire me and how will I support myself?”13   
 It was not until 1970 that women’s enrollment in J.D. programs at American Bar 
Association accredited schools reached 10%, and it was not until 1985 that thirty percent of J.D. 
candidates nationally were women.
14
  In 1994, this figure peaked at 50.4%, and since then, it has 
hovered between 43% and 49%.
15
 
B. Women in Law Schools Today 
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) reports that in the 2011–2012 academic year, 
women comprised 46.7% of the total J.D. enrollment at ABA-accredited law schools 
nationwide.
16
  While this number indicates a significant increase in women’s J.D. enrollment 
over the past thirty years, it also illustrates a relatively steady decline in women’s J.D. enrollment 
from 2002 to the present.
17
  The importance of this trend is its impact on the legal profession as a 
whole: quite simply, fewer women in law school means fewer women lawyers.
18
 
                                                 
13
    See Lynn Gilbert & Gaylen Moore, Particular Passions: Talks With Women Who 
Have Shaped Our Times 167–69 (Clarkson Potter ed. 1988). 
14
  See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FIRST YEAR AND TOTAL J.D. ENROLLMENT BY 
GENDER 1947–2011 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter ABA ENROLLMENT]. 
15
  See id. 
16
  See id. 
17
  Women comprised 49% of J.D. enrollment at ABA-accredited schools in 2002–2003 
and 2003–2004, and they have not comprised that much of the total J.D. enrollment since those 
years.  See id.; see also Vivia Chen, Women Spurn Law Schools, THE CAREERIST, May 16, 2011, 
available at http://thecareerist.typepad.com/thecareerist/2011/05/fewer-women-at-nations-law-
schools.html (noting that women’s law school enrollment has steadily declined since 2002 and 
offering potential explanations for this trend).  
18
   See Debra Cassens Weiss, Have Women’s Law School Numbers Peaked? NAWL 
Report Suggests The Pipeline May Be Shrinking, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL (Nov. 
10, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/have_womens_law_school_ 
numbers_peaked_nawl_report_suggests_the_pipeline_is_/; see also Press Release, National 
Association of Women Lawyers, National Association of Women Lawyers Releases Sixth 
Annual Survey (Nov. 10, 2011), available at http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.com/files/2011 
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 The most salient explanation for the currently declining women’s J.D. enrollment figures 
may be exactly the sentiment expressed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg regarding her law school 
experience in the early 1950s.
19
  The main difference made by the past fifty years, however, is 
that women can now look to extensive collections of numerical data to support their conclusion 
that they are less likely than their male counterparts to advance in the legal profession.
20
  Indeed, 
the former president of the National Association of Women Lawyers summarized this feeling in 
the following manner: “Twenty years ago, when you had a lot of women coming out of law 
school, the ceiling was not as apparent as it is now. You didn’t have as many statistics or 
information.”21  Jessie Kornberg, executive director of the Ms. JD organization, agrees that 
women are well aware of and discouraged by the fact that there has been “no discernible 
progress for women in the legal profession in roughly a decade.”22 
 Women’s lack of success in the legal profession arguably begins in law school or even 
earlier.  In November 1994, Lani Guinier and four co-authors became the first to extensively 
                                                                                                                                                             
%20Sixth%20Annual%20NAWL%20Survey%20Press%20Release%20vF%281%29.pdf (“Not 
only do women represent a decreasing percentage of lawyers in big firms, they are more likely to 
occupy positions—like staff attorneys, counsel, and fixed-income equity partners—with 
diminished opportunity for advancement or participation in firm leadership.”). 
19
  See supra text accompanying note 13. 
20
  See, e.g., CATALYST, WOMEN IN LAW IN THE U.S. (Jul. 2012) [hereinafter CATALYST 
SURVEY] (presenting data to illustrate the “drastic difference between women and men at the 
highest levels in law firms” and showing numerically that women are underrepresented in nearly 
every area of the legal profession, including academia and general counsel positions), THE 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS AND THE NAWL FOUNDATION, REPORT OF THE 
SIXTH ANNUAL NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 
(Oct. 2011) [hereinafter NAWL SURVEY] (analyzing data to show, among other things, that 
women in the legal profession are promoted at lower rates than men, compensated at lower levels 
than men, and elevated to positions of leadership less often than men), ABA COMMISSION ON 
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, CURRENT GLANCE OF WOMEN IN THE LAW (Jan. 2011) (using charts 
and graphs to illustrate women’s underrepresentation in various aspects of the legal profession). 
21
  See Chen, supra note 17. 
22
  See id. 
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study and write about the gender gap in law school performance.
23
  After conducting a 
comprehensive empirical study of students enrolled at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School between 1987 and 1992, Guinier and her co-authors concluded that “men outperform 
women at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.”24  Much to the surprise of many law 
school deans and administrators,
25
 this study revealed that by the end of the first year of law 
school, men were three times more likely than women to be in the top 10% of their law school 
class.
26
  Guinier’s article suggested that this severe performance gap was caused by the 
systematic alienation of women in the law school setting.
27
  More importantly, Guinier 
challenged contemporary women to demonstrate that mere access to law schools alone is 
inadequate.
28
  Ultimately, Guinier and her co-authors recommended that a spirit of “genuine 
inclusion” in both the legal educational and professional spheres calls for school to do more than 
simply “add women and stir.”29 
 Women’s conspicuous lack of success in law school and the legal profession presents a 
“chicken and egg” problem in that it is unclear which is the cause giving rise to the counterpart 
effect.  Since Guinier’s article was published nearly twenty years ago, numerous other scholars 
have attempted to focus on narrower aspects of women’s law school experiences to help explain 
                                                 
23
  See Lani Guinier, et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences At One Ivy 
League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1994). 
24
  Id. at 5. 
25
  See Laura Mansnerus, Men Found to Do Better in Law School Than Women, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/10/us/men-found-to-do-better-in-law-
school-than-women.html (describing law schools administrators’ reaction as “perplexed” and 
“pretty startled”).  
26
   See Guinier, et al., supra note 23, at 5.  These findings were reinforced by a much 
larger study of over 6,000 students at law schools across the country that yielded similar results.  
See Mansnerus, supra note 25. 
27
   See Guinier, et al., supra note 23, at 5. 
28
   See id. 
29
   See id. 
10 
 
why women are underperforming men within both the sphere of legal education sphere and the 
legal profession more broadly.
30
 
C. The Development of Scholarship on Women in Law 
 As soon as significant numbers of women began attending law school, scholars and 
commentators began to devote an increasing amount of attention to the topic of women in law.  
The first legal publication to focus on women’s issues in the law was the Women’s Rights Law 
Reporter, first published by Rutgers Law School in 1971 and advised by then-Professor Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg.
31
  Since then, over two dozen new journals have been devoted to gender, race, 
ethnicity, and sexual orientation issues in the legal education world.
32
   
 Despite this attention, however, it remains uncertain why exactly women seem to 
experience law school so differently than men.  Early studies of women and the law focused on 
relatively narrow questions about women’s initial entry and adaptation into the legal 
profession.
33
  Later, and largely overlapping with the Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) 
movement,
34
 studies of women and the law became heavily influenced by feminist legal theory.
35
  
Especially notable among these works of feminist legal theory is the work of Carol Gilligan, who 
                                                 
30
   See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
31
   See Elizabeth Langer, The Birth of the Women’s Rights Law Reporter, BARNARD 
COLLEGE NEWS (Nov. 30, 2010), http://barnard.edu/headlines/birth-womens-rights-law-reporter. 
32
   See Judith Resnik, A Continuous Body: Ongoing Conversations About Women And 
Legal Education, p. 567 & n. 13 (Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository Faculty 
Scholarship Series, Paper 763, Jan. 1, 2003), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi 
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1762&context=fss_papers. 
33
   See, e.g., David M. White & Terry E. Roth, The Law School Admission Test and the 
Continuing Minority Status of Women in Law Schools, 2 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 103 (1979) 
(focusing on the effects on women resulting from law schools' increased reliance on the LSAT); 
Alice D. Jacobs, Women in Law School: Structural Constraint and Personal Choice in the 
Formation of Professional Identity, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 462, 467-68 (1972) (discussing the 
effects of gender stereotyping on women’s legal education). 
34
  See Ramachandran, supra note 3, at 1765. 
35
   See Guinier, et al., supra note 23, at 100. 
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studied the difference between men’s and women’s moral reasoning,36 the work of Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, who argued that the early exclusion of women from legal professional and 
educational institutions produced institutions very different from what would have resulted with 
women’s involvement,37 and the work of Mari Matsuda, who theorized that members of 
oppressed groups, including women in the law school setting, possess a “‘multiple 
consciousness’ which includes both mainstream American consciousness and the outsider’s 
consciousness.”38 
D.  Contemporary Scholarship on Women in Law 
 In the late 1980s, empirical studies of women’s experiences at Yale Law School39 and the 
University of California Berkeley School of Law
40
 (Boalt Hall) built upon Carol Gilligan’s and 
Mari Matsuda’s critical findings to conclude that women experience law school differently than 
men and that law schools should hire more female faculty members to make women students’ 
experiences more positive.
41
  Lani Guinier’s article, in turn, further contributed to these early 
studies by providing the “first [study] that attempts to weave a full analysis out of self-reported 
survey data, actual academic performance data, and open-ended narrative responses.”42  In 
addition to arguing that women law students are less successful than their male counterparts due 
                                                 
36
  See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S 
DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
37
  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's 
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 41-42 (1985). 
38
   Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as 
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 7 (1989) 
39
  See Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988). 
40
  See Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted But Not Accepted: Outsiders Take An 
Inside Look At Law School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1989). 
41
   See Weiss & Melling, supra note 39, at 1356–57; Homer & Schwartz, supra note 40, 
at 29. 
42
  See Guinier, et al., supra note 23, at 100. 
12 
 
to feelings of systematic alienation, Guinier’s article argued that law schools create and 
legitimate “larger sets of social stratifications” in the legal profession.43 
 Guinier’s article, which she later expanded into a book,44 became a launching pad for 
multitudinous modern legal scholarship on women and the law.
45
  This scholarship has built 
upon Guinier’s path-breaking article in a wide variety of ways, from advocating the creation of 
all-women’s law schools46 to re-evaluating the effectiveness of traditional law school teaching 
methods
47
 to calling for an expanded understanding of Guinier’s work that goes beyond its 
underpinnings in feminist “difference” theory.48  Despite their vast differences, however, 
                                                 
43
   See Guinier, et al., supra note 23, at 100. 
44
  See LANI GUINIER, ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997). 
45
   A number of these scholarly pieces directly cite Guinier’s article as their inspiration.  
See, e.g., Eli Wald et al., Looking Beyond Gender: Women’s Experiences At Law School, 48 
TULSA L. REV. 27, n.a1 (Summer 2012) (“[W]e wish not only to acknowledge and build on 
Guinier’s path-breaking work, but also to somewhat deviate from it. . . .”); Sarah E. Thiemann, 
Beyond Guinier: A Critique Of Legal Pedagogy, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 17, 18 
(1998) (“This piece will consider Guinier’s recommendations and add some additional 
suggestions.”). 
46
  See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, “To Give Them Countenance”: The Case For A 
Women’s Law School, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (Spring 1999) (advocating “a single-sex law 
school designed and run exclusively for women students”). 
47
   See, e.g., Polly Beth Proctor, Toward Mythos and Mythology: Applying A Feminist 
Critique To Legal Education To Effectuate A Socialization Of Both Sexes In Law School 
Classrooms, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 577, 577–78 (Summer 2004) (arguing that “the 
structure and methodology behind legal education. . .not only creates an intimidating 
environment that does not as effectively engage women's initiative or problem-solving abilities,
 
but. . .also fails to promote the most effective lawyering for either sex.”); cf. Elizabeth Garrett, 
Becoming Lawyers, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 199 (Winter 1998) (defending the Socratic method as 
effective pedagogy in response to Guinier’s “indictment” of it). 
48
   See, e.g., Eli Wald et al., supra note 45, at n.a1 (Summer 2012) (“While becoming 
lawyers still entails becoming gentlemen, it also meaningfully involves developing and pursuing 
racial, ethnic, cultural, socioeconomic, and familial aspects of one's identity.”); see also 
Ramachandran, supra note 3, at 1759 (promoting poststructuralist feminist theory as means of 
closing the “gaps” in Guinier’s and other early studies and as an effective avenue for advancing 
change in legal education). 
13 
 
virtually all of these pieces share in common a desire to better understand women’s 
contemporary law school experiences.  
 In pursuit of this understanding, a significant portion of modern scholarship comprises 
studies that focus on relatively narrow aspects of women’s law school experiences.  Notable 
conclusions drawn by these studies include the observations that women are less successful than 
men in law school moot court competitions,
49
 women faculty and students publish legal 
scholarship at significantly lower rates than men,
50
 and women are underrepresented on their 
schools’ law reviews.51  Additionally, a number of professional organizations, including the 
American Bar Association,
52
 the National Association of Women Lawyers,
53
 Catalyst,
54
 New 
York Law School,
55
 and Ms. JD,
56
 have undertaken empirical studies and statistical analysis to 
contribute to the growing field of knowledge on this topic.  The issue of women in the law has 
become a hot topic even for popular magazines and blogs, including The American Prospect
57
 
                                                 
49
  See Mairi N. Morrison, May It Please Whose Court?: How Moot Court Perpetuates 
Gender Bias In The “Real World” Of Practice, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 49, 50 (Fall 1995). 
50
  See Minna J. Kotkin, Of Authorship And Audacity: An Empirical Study Of Gender 
Disparity And Privilege In The “Top Ten” Law Reviews, 31 WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. REP. 385, 386 
(Summer 2010) (analyzing the gender disparity in faculty publication rates on the top ten law 
reviews); Nancy Leong, A Noteworthy Absence, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 279 (2009) (focusing on 
gender disparity in publication rates of student Notes and arguing that this disparity is primarily 
the result of women students’ alienation from law reviews). 
51
   See Allison L. Bowers, Women at the University of Texas School of Law: A Call For 
Action, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 117 (2000) (discussing women’s underrepresentation on the 
University of Texas Law Review and suggesting that this is a result of  “a systematic devaluation 
of women’s writing”). 
52
  See ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 20.  
53
  See NAWL SURVEY, supra note 20. 
54
  See CATALYST SURVEY, supra note 20. 
55
  See THE NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW, LAW REVIEW DIVERSITY REPORT 
(Oct. 2012).  
56
  See MS. JD, WOMEN ON LAW REVIEW: A GENDER DIVERSITY REPORT (2009); MS. JD, 
WOMEN ON LAW REVIEW: A GENDER DIVERSITY REPORT (2011). 
57
  See Pema Levy, Law Schools’ Women Problem, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (May 19, 
2011), available at http://prospect.org/article/law-schools-women-problem. 
14 
 
and the legal blog Above The Law, which chimed in on the results of the latest Ms. JD study by 
commenting that law reviews across the nation are becoming “something of a good old boys’ 
club”58 and urging law reviews to “do better in terms of reaching a greater gender equality 
among their top brass.”59  
II. METHODOLOGY 
A. Overview and Scope 
 Recent studies investigating women’s law review membership have tended to rely on self-
reporting.  The most recently released study of law review membership, for example, relied on 
self-reported responses from “law school students, law review support staff, and recent law 
school alumni,” some of whom had previous connections to Ms. JD, to anonymously compile 
data from thirty-five of the top fifty law reviews.
60
  Furthermore, although recent studies have 
published comprehensive sets of data, none has yet performed statistical analysis on that data.
61
  
My goal in my data collection and analysis, therefore, was to perform the first thorough yet 
readily comprehensible statistical analysis of law review gender diversity data collected from 
independently reported and verified sources.  
 To keep my study narrow enough to be manageable yet wide enough to be valuable, I 
limited my study to the past five years’ membership on the law reviews ranked within the top 
twenty by the Washington & Lee University Law Library.  I chose these law reviews because 
they are reputed to be leaders and models for hundreds of assorted legal journals all across the 
nation.  Notably, the list of Washington & Lee University Law Library top twenty law reviews is 
                                                 
58
  Staci Zaretsky, The Lovely Ladies Of Law Review: Where Are The EICs? ABOVE THE 
LAW BLOG (Oct. 19, 2012, 11:55 a.m.) available at http://abovethelaw.com/2012/10/the-lovely-
ladies-of-law-review-where-are-the-eics/. 
59
   Id. 
60
   See MS. JD (2011), supra note 56, at 1. 
61
   See Mullins & Leong, supra note 2, at 387 & n.11. 
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not identical to the U.S. News & World Report list of top twenty law schools, though the two lists 
share a high degree of overlap.
62
   
 I limited my study to each school’s flagship, general-interest law review largely to promote 
clarity and consistency; although the schools in my study have widely varying numbers and 
types of legal journals, their general-interest law reviews all share in common no limitations on 
subject-matter and recognition as the school’s most prestigious journal.  Moreover, I limited my 
study to flagship law reviews to reduce the complexity of my statistical analysis by removing 
consideration of non-independent events
63
 and eliminating the problem of overlapping 
membership between journals.
64
   
 I focused my study on the past five years (2008–09 academic year through the 2012–13 
academic year) so that my data would be comprehensive enough to provide an accurate picture 
of women’s involvement on law reviews, yet restricted enough to honor the rapidly changing 
nature of student-run law reviews that do not necessarily adhere to or even have long-term 
institutional memory.
65
    
                                                 
62
  Aside from ranking order, the most significant differences between these two lists is 
that Notre Dame Law School, Fordham Law School, and William & Mary Law School do not 
appear on the U.S. News & World Report list of top twenty law schools, and conversely, Duke 
University School of Law, George Washington University Law School, and the Gould School of 
Law at the University of Southern California do not appear on the Washington & Lee Law 
Library list of top twenty law reviews. 
63
  At a number of schools, students are considered first for law review and then 
considered for membership on other journals only if denied law review membership.  For 
purposes of statistical analysis, this means that membership on the “secondary” journals is not an 
entirely independent event; rather, it is influenced by the outcome of a separate event. 
64
   Several schools, including Harvard and the University of Texas, allow members of 
their law reviews to simultaneously serve as members of other journals.  This overlapping 
membership would have posed a problem for my study that was not necessary to confront for 
purposes of this Note. 
65
  Several schools, including Yale and Notre Dame, specifically emphasized that their 
law review admissions processes are highly subject to change from year to year, and others, 
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B. Enrollment Data 
 To perform as accurate an analysis as possible, I sought to collect all of my quantitative 
data from independently reported and verified sources.  I therefore took my general school 
enrollment data from archives of the ABA-LSAC Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools,
66
 
and I determined law review membership by gender for each school by manually counting and 
sorting names on the past five years’ mastheads from each school’s general interest law review.67 
 Although women have come to comprise nearly half of the nation’s juris doctorate (J.D.) 
candidates at ABA-approved law schools,
68
 specific enrollment figures vary quite widely among 
different schools and between individual years.  The average female J.D. enrollment across the 
twenty schools and five years in my data sample was 46.27%, but women made up as much as 
58.59%
69
 and as little as 39.35%
70
 of J.D. students at particular schools during particular years.  
This wide variation increased the importance of comparing law review memberships to specific 
enrollment figures in order to accurately determine whether law review gender disparity exists 
and how great that disparity is at particular schools during particular years.
71
 
 Importantly, the J.D. enrollment figures do not exactly represent the pool of potential law 
review members for three main reasons.  First, the J.D. enrollment figures include first-year 
students, whereas law review membership comprises only second- and third-year students.  
                                                                                                                                                             
including New York University, indicated that their law review admissions processes had 
undergone relatively recent changes. 
66
  See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-
APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS ARCHIVES (2006–2008 and 2009–2012), http://www.lsac.org/ 
lsacresources/publications/official-guide-archives.asp#M-O. 
67
   See infra Part II.B. 
68
   See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
69
  University of California at Berkeley during the 2008–2009 academic year. 
70
  University of Virginia during the 2008–2009 academic year. 
71
  This is to be contrasted with an approach that might, for example, assuming that an 
average figure such as 46.27% was mostly accurate for all schools in the sample and comparing 
individual law review membership compositions to that figure. 
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Second, the enrollment figures count both full-time and part-time students for those schools with 
both programs, but part-time students are sometimes not eligible to become members of law 
review.
72
  Third, because applying for law review membership is voluntary, not all J.D. 
candidates counted in the enrollment figures are necessarily candidates for law review 
membership.   
 Despite these shortcomings, I nonetheless found the J.D. enrollment figures sufficient for 
my purposes—that is, determining whether or not a law review gender disparity exists and 
identifying general similarities among law review admission processes that may help stimulate 
discussions on possible causes of this disparity—because the gender composition of new first-
year classes is usually not much different from the second- and third-year classes at the schools 
in my study.  Furthermore, the results of my statistical analysis are significant and consistent 
enough across various tests to remain true even if the enrollment figures were altered to better 
reflect only the pool of potential law review members.   
C. Masthead Collection 
Nearly all of the top twenty law reviews’ mastheads for the past five years were publicly  
available on the internet, and I was able to obtain those that were not through either direct 
request or manual collection from hard copies of law reviews.  Once I collected the mastheads, I 
determined the gender composition of the law review memberships by manually counting the 
number of men and number of women on the mastheads.  Most members’ genders were 
discernible by their typically masculine or feminine names, such as “Joseph” or “Lauren.”73  For 
                                                 
72
  Georgetown University Law Center and Fordham Law School have part-time 
programs and thus may be more susceptible to this inaccuracy than the other schools in my 
study. 
73
  I acknowledge that my methodology relies upon a binary conception of gender 
identity, and I wish to clarify that I do not support this type of binary approach to gender identity 
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the members whose names were gender-neutral (“Alex” or “Jamie”), particularly uncommon 
(“Kapiljeet”), or ambiguous for any other reason, I conducted internet research to determine the 
individual’s gender.  This procedure enabled me to identify the genders of the members 
represented by approximately 99.5% of all the names on all the mastheads.
 74
  Because I was able 
to identify the genders of such a high number of the total members, I noted and then simply did 
not count the few remaining “unknowns,” and I adjusted my total membership counts 
accordingly.  
 A practical side benefit of examining mastheads to determine gender composition  
was that it removed some onus from the law review editors who generously took time to speak 
with me about their law review’s selection methods and their perceptions of the way those 
methods impact law review gender diversity.  Furthermore, because I examined all of the 
mastheads personally, each and every name was subject to exactly the same treatment and level 
of scrutiny.   
D. Qualitative Data 
1. Publicly Available Information 
                                                                                                                                                             
issues.  Short of finding and contacting each of the thousands of law review members listed on 
these mastheads, however, I was unable to logistically design my empirical study in a way that 
would account for members who identify as transgender, nongendered, genderfluid, or otherwise 
genderqueer.  Additionally, the other key segment of my quantitative data, the publicly available 
enrollment data, classifies students as only either male or female.  Ideally, we will move away 
from this type of binary thinking in future years so that researchers will one day be able to 
conduct a study like this that accounts for a much broader range of gender identity. 
74
  It is entirely possible and quite likely that several of the names that I counted as 
“typically masculine” may actually belong to women and vice versa.   As with non-binary gender 
identities, see supra note 73, I simply did not have the resources to individually contact each of 
the thousands of law review members included in my study.  I regret any errors that may have 
resulted from this possible gender misclassification.  Because my sample size is relatively large 
and my study aims to identify only broad trends, any possible errors of this nature should have 
minimal effects on my ultimate analysis and discussion. 
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 Among the top twenty law reviews, seventeen provide at least some brief description of 
their admission processes on public websites.
75
  I began my empirical research by collecting this 
publicly available information and arranging it into a basic table so that I could best identify 
what additional data I should solicit directly from law review editors.  I initially divided this 
table into columned checklists recording whether each law review used the following selection 
methods: (1) grade-on, (2) write-on, (3) a composite or combination score of some sort, (4) 
publish-on (sometimes also called “Note-on”), and (5) personal statement and/or affirmative 
action.   
2. Solicited Information 
 After organizing and reviewing publicly available information on law review selection 
processes,
76
 I wrote letters to the editors-in-chief of each of the top twenty law reviews 
requesting the following information: (1) a brief description of selection criteria, i.e., how many 
applicants “grade on,” how many applicants “write on,” and how many applicants are offered 
membership through some other selection criteria, and (2) within each of these selection 
categories, how many of the most recently admitted class of members (2012–13) were men and 
how many were women.  To clarify the second part of my request, I provided the following 
example: “If your law review admits 15 grade on members, 15 write on members, and 15 
members on some other basis, I am interested to know the gender breakdown of the members in 
each of those three categories, e.g., 10 men and 5 women graded on, 7 men and 8 women wrote 
on, etc.”  Finally, I expressed interest in knowing whether, why, and how each law review 
currently implements any affirmative action policies.   
                                                 
75
   The exceptions are the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, the Notre Dame Law 
Review, and the William & Mary Law Review. 
76
  See supra Part II.C. 
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 I sent these letters to the editors-in-chief via email and invited them to respond by either 
phone or email.  I collected responses from sixteen of the twenty law reviews over a two-month 
period from mid-November 2012 through mid-January 2013.
77
  About half of the editors-in-chief 
who responded provided me with exactly the information I requested.  The other half responded 
that they either did not keep records of gender breakdown by selection method
78
 or that they 
were unwilling to share that information given their desire to preserve the complete 
confidentiality and anonymity of their processes.
79
 
III. DATA AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
A. General Observations 
To begin my analysis, I recorded the raw numbers of women enrolled in each law school  
during each year, women on the masthead of each law review during each year, men enrolled in 
law school during each year, and men on the masthead of each law review during each year.  I 
then used these raw numbers to generate basic percentages by gender for both law school 
enrollment and law review membership.  I also used these raw numbers to generate ratios for 
both women and men by dividing the number of women on the masthead by the number of 
women enrolled in the school and repeating the same process for men.  This resulted in a mean 
value of 0.1098 for men and 0.0921 for women, meaning that within my sample of schools and 
years, nearly 11% of male J.D. candidates were members of law reviews while approximately 
9% of J.D. candidates were members of law reviews. 
                                                 
77
  The four law reviews that did not respond to my inquiry were Columbia Law Review, 
Minnesota Law Review, UCLA Law Review, and Fordham Law Review. 
78
  The following law reviews informed me that they do not track gender breakdown by 
selection method: Michigan Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Texas Law 
Review, Georgetown Law Journal, Vanderbilt Law Review, and University of Chicago Law 
Review. 
79
  The following law reviews did not wish to publicize gender breakdown by selection 
method: Harvard Law Review, Virginia Law Review, and William & Mary Law Review. 
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After generating ratios, I ran a two-sample t-test for all twenty schools and all five years 
in my study.  This yielded a statistically significant p-value of 0.0011,
80
 showing clearly that 
there is a statistically significant gender disparity among the top twenty law reviews.  I then ran a 
linear regression on the data that accounted for multiple observations of the same schools across 
different years and reaffirmed the gender disparity apparent from the aggregate two-sample t-
test.  Despite this overall gender disparity, however, not every law review membership displays a 
statistically significant gender disparity, and even among those that do, the severity of the gender 
disparity varies quite widely.
81
  This non-universality is illustrated most clearly in the following 
scatter 
plot:
                                                 
80
  The statistical tests in my study use a 95% confidence interval, reflecting a confidence 
level of 0.05.  
81
  See infra Part III.B. 
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The identity line represents my null hypothesis—that is, a y=x line where the x-axis is ratio of 
men and the y-axis is ratio of women (or, in other words, complete gender parity on the school’s 
law review given its total numbers of male and female J.D. candidates)—and takes into account 
the different sizes of total enrollment and law review membership at each of the schools in my 
study.  Therefore, the schools above that line have higher ratios of women than men, and the 
schools below the line have higher ratios of men than women.  Each school has five points on the 
scatter plot representing each of the five years in my study. 
 Interestingly, most of the schools’ separate points on the plot are relatively close to one 
another, or, to put it differently, most of the schools have at least three or four of their five total 
points grouped in about the same place on the plot.  For example, most of Cornell’s points fall 
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between 0.1 and 0.15 on the y-axis and between the 0.15 and 0.2 on the x-axis, and all of 
Cornell’s points save one are below the identity line.  The same is true for both Penn and 
William & Mary.  
 A further interesting observation is that this scatter plot reveals the differences between 
schools in the ratios themselves.  For example, Harvard’s placement in the bottom left-hand 
corner of the plot indicates relatively low ratios for both men and women, meaning generally that 
fewer than one in fifteen students enrolled at Harvard are members of the Harvard Law Review. 
By contrast, Yale’s points are grouped towards the upper right-hand corner of the plot, revealing 
that nearly one in four students enrolled at Yale are members of the Yale Law Journal.  This 
placement appears to roughly correlate with the sizes of the school populations; that is, the 
schools with lower total enrollments tend to have higher ratios for both men and women, and this 
makes sense in light of each law review’s need for a staff of a certain size to run a successful 
publication.  Not all of these placements line up neatly in order of school size, however.  
Chicago, for example, has some of the lowest enrollment figures of the schools in my study, yet 
its ratios are still lower than about half of the other schools’ (including similarly-sized 
Vanderbilt).   
B. Two-Sample T-Test 
To take a closer look at each school’s membership, I used a two-sample t-test to analyze 
the enrollment and masthead data that I collected from each school.  I chose the two-sample t-
test because it is one of the most common statistical tests used to determine whether the average 
difference between two groups is truly significant or whether that difference could be merely the 
product of random chance, and here, I sought to answer the question whether there was any 
significant difference between the average ratio of women on a particular law review and the 
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average ratio of men on that law review.
82
  My null hypothesis was that there was no significant 
difference between these average ratios. 
 For each school, I was most interested in the mean values for both women and men and 
the p-value, which told me whether the difference between those means was significant.  If a 
school’s p-value was greater than 0.05, then I accepted the null hypothesis for that school; that is, 
I concluded that there was no significant difference between the average ratio of women and the 
average ratio of men on that school’s law review. 
 The following table summarizes my two-sample t-test findings for each of the schools: 
  Mean Value for Women Mean Value for Men t-value p-value 
Berkeley 0.1424 0.1363 -0.7227 0.4904 
Chicago 0.0697 0.1312 12.8188 0 
Columbia 0.0684 0.0681 -0.1314 0.8987 
Cornell 0.1098 0.1599 5.0314 0.001 
Fordham 0.0690 0.0782 1.4151 0.1948 
Georgetown 0.0426 0.0616 5.9182 0.0004 
Harvard 0.0336 0.0649 9.0507 0 
Michigan 0.0701 0.0916 3.9449 0.0043 
Minnesota 0.1079 0.0894 -3.0634 0.0155 
NYU 0.0696 0.0650 -1.3266 0.2213 
Northwestern 0.1128 0.1007 -1.1083 0.2999 
Notre Dame 0.0714 0.1018 6.0133 0.0003 
Penn 0.1172 0.1521 4.0976 0.0034 
Stanford 0.1639 0.1631 -0.0633 0.9511 
Texas 0.0598 0.0983 7.5021 0.0001 
UCLA 0.0987 0.0947 -0.6185 0.5535 
Vanderbilt 0.0960 0.1091 2.7573 0.0248 
Virginia 0.0619 0.0962 3.83 0.005 
William & 
Mary 0.1183 0.1362 4.8924 0.0012 
Yale 0.1584 0.1970 3.0153 0.0167 
 
                                                 
82
  I calculated these ratios by using dividing the average number of women on the law 
review’s masthead by the average number of women enrolled in the school, see supra Part III.A. 
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 Of the twenty schools I included in my study, two had p-values of 0 at three decimal 
places:  University of Chicago Law School and Harvard Law School.  This particularly low p-
value means that at each of these two schools, there is less than a one in 10,000 chance that the 
ratio of women (or men) on the law review would randomly result given the numbers of women 
and men enrolled in each school.  Not far behind the University of Chicago Law School and 
Harvard Law School were the University of Texas Law School (p-value of 0.0001), Notre Dame 
Law School (p-value of 0.0003), and the Georgetown University Law Center (p-value of 
0.0004). 
 Several schools in my study yielded p-values high enough to warrant acceptance of the 
null hypothesis, meaning that I could not reject with 95% confidence the possibility that any 
gender disparity resulted from anything other than random chance.  The schools with the highest 
p-values were Stanford Law School (p-value of 0.9511) and Columbia Law School (p-value of 
0.8987).  The next two highest p-values belonged to the UCLA School of Law (0.5535) and the 
UC Berkeley School of Law (0.4904).  Although their p-values were quite a bit lower than the 
three previously listed schools, Northwestern University Law School (p-value of 0.2999), New 
York University School of Law (p-value of 0.2213), and Fordham Law School (p-value of 
0.1948) all had close enough ratios of men and women on their law reviews that I cannot reject 
the possibility that any disparity simply resulted from random chance. 
C. Qualitative Data 
In an effort to identify possible links between law review gender diversity and selection 
methods, I used publicly available information and information solicited from the editors-in-
chief of the top twenty law reviews to gain as much an understanding as I could about how each 
26 
 
law review selects its members.
83
  I then divided these law reviews into four rough categories: 
(1) “Write-on only” for law reviews that did not at all consider candidates’ grades in their 
admissions processes, (2) “Heavily writing” for law reviews that either weighted writing scores 
more heavily than grades in their admissions consideration, admitted more members based on 
writing scores than grades, or some combination of the two, (3) “Evenly grades/writing” for law 
reviews that gave approximately equal weight to grades and writing scores evenly, admitted the 
same numbers of students by a “write-on” method as by a “grade-on” method, or both, and (4) 
“Heavily grades” for law reviews that weighted grades more heavily than writing scores, 
admitted more members based on grades than writing scores, or some combination of the two.  
This yielded the following table: 
  Write-on only Heavily writing 
Evenly 
grades/writing Heavily grades 
Berkeley x       
Chicago       x 
Columbia     x   
Cornell       x 
Fordham       x 
Georgetown   x     
Harvard   x     
Michigan   x     
Minnesota   x     
Northwestern   x     
Notre Dame       x 
NYU     x   
Penn     x   
Stanford x       
Texas   x     
UCLA   x     
Vanderbilt     x   
Virginia       x 
William & Mary     x   
Yale x       
                                                 
83
   See supra Part II.D. 
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Importantly, these categorizations are based only on my own understanding of each law review’s 
admission process, and some schools were more difficult to classify than others.
84
  Additionally, 
certain schools that I have grouped together within the same category nonetheless have very 
different admissions processes, and some of the law reviews admissions processes are subject to 
change from year to year.
85
  Finally, a number of law reviews noted that in addition to the more 
conventional admissions process that considers grades and/or writing scores, they have a 
“publish-on” or “note-on” admissions route through which non-law review members are offered 
membership if their work is accepted for publication by the law review, and other schools noted 
that they have a separate admissions process for transfer students.
86
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Key Observations 
1. Selection Methods 
Because my primary goal in this Note at the outset was to analyze gender disparity on 
law reviews and identify commonalities that might help explain that disparity, I begin my 
discussion here with a look at overlap between schools’ placement in my quantitative and 
qualitative analyses; in other words, I look first at similarities among admissions processes on 
                                                 
84
  Classifying a law review as “Evenly grades/writing,” for example, called for more 
subjective judgment than classifying a law review as “Writing only.” 
85
   In their responses to my requests for information, the editors-in-chief of the Yale Law 
Journal and Notre Dame Law Review both specially emphasized that their admissions processes 
often change on a yearly basis: the Yale Law Journal’s admissions process is governed at the 
discretion of its editorial board, and the Notre Dame Law Review’s admissions process is 
similarly governed at the discretion of its editor-in-chief. 
86
  Although I do not wish to minimize the differences between law reviews’ admissions 
processes or the impact of additional admissions processes, I limited my categorization to four 
broad categories in order to keep my analysis simple enough to fulfill my goal of beginning a 
discussion about law review gender diversity by identifying similarities between law review 
admissions processes that may help explain similarities among the gender composition of those 
law reviews’ memberships. 
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law reviews with similar gender disparities.  I then follow up on this inquiry by examining 
affirmative action practices as a possible root of similarity between law reviews with similar 
gender composition. 
The five schools in my study with the greatest gender disparities, in descending order of 
gender disparity, were the University of Chicago Law School, Harvard Law School, University 
of Texas Law School, Notre Dame Law School, and the Georgetown University Law Center.
87
  
All of these law reviews share in common that they consider both grades and writing score in 
some way during their admissions processes.  Beyond this basic similarity, however, these law 
review admissions processes are quite different, so much so that I classified three as “heavily 
writing” (Harvard, Texas, and Georgetown) and the other two as “heavily grades” (Chicago and 
Notre Dame).  To highlight just how different these processes are, for example, Harvard Law 
Review admits no members on the basis of grades alone and only fourteen of its forty-four new 
members each year on the basis of a combination of grades and writing score,
88
 whereas Notre 
Dame Law Review selects fifteen of its twenty-five new members each year on the basis of 
grades alone.
89
 
At the other end of the spectrum, seven schools in my study showed no statistically 
significant gender disparity.  In descending order of gender parity, these schools are the 
following: Stanford Law School, Columbia Law School, UCLA School of Law, UC Berkeley 
School of Law, Northwestern Law School, New York University School of Law, and Fordham 
                                                 
87
   See supra Part III.B. 
88
  See e-mail from Conor Tochilin, President, Vol. 126, Harvard Law Review, to author 
(Nov. 13, 2012, 3:45 p.m.) (on file with author). 
89
  See e-mail from Joseph Florczak, Editor-in-Chief, Vol. 88, Notre Dame Law Review, 
to author (Nov. 15, 2012, 4:11 p.m.) (on file with author). 
29 
 
Law School.
90
  These seven schools were scattered across all four possibilities that I created to 
categorize admissions processes.  Indeed, the differences among these schools’ admissions 
processes are so great that two of the seven—Stanford and Berkeley—do not consider anything 
other than writing scores, whereas the other five consider at least some other criterion to a 
significant degree.  
 The remaining eight law reviews’ memberships each display statistically significant 
gender disparities, but again, these eight law reviews are spread across the four admissions 
process categories, and even those law reviews grouped within the same category use markedly 
different processes.  Aside from noting that most (but not all!) of these law reviews use multiple 
selection methods to ultimately create a full class, it is very difficult to pinpoint any more 
specific similarity that might account for their highly similar gender disparities. 
2. Gender Breakdown by Selection Method 
Several of the editors-in-chief were unable or unwilling to share gender breakdown by 
selection method for the most recently admitted class of law review members.  A few editors-in-
chief, however, did share this information with me.  This data, though not comprehensive enough 
to use for any purpose of statistical analysis or evaluation, adds an interesting anecdotal piece to 
the developing picture of the gender disparity on law reviews.   
As an associate on the Cornell Law Review, my initial interest in law review gender 
diversity only increased upon learning that out of sixteen exclusively “grade-on” associates in 
my class, only two were women.
91
  Similarly, only three of the fifteen total “grade-on” members 
                                                 
90
   See supra Part III.B. 
91
  See Telephone Interview with Susan G. Pado, Administrative Assistant, Cornell Law 
Review (Jan. 9, 2013). 
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of the 2012–13 class on the Notre Dame Law Review were women.92  Anecdotal evidence like 
this might seem to initially support a hypothesis that the “grade-on” selection method is a 
primary culprit leading to gender disparity in law review membership, especially because highly 
statistically significant gender disparities characterize both the Cornell Law Review and Notre 
Dame Law Review memberships.   
 Interestingly, however, the contemporary class of members on the Stanford Law Review, 
who could only write-on, comprises fifteen women and twenty-nine men, and the contemporary 
class members of the Yale Law Review similarly comprises twenty women and thirty-four men.  
This leads to a very similar total membership breakdown by gender, despite completely 
different—and indeed opposite, if one views the “heavily grades” oriented Cornell and Notre 
Dame processes as the other end of the spectrum from the “write-on only” processes at Stanford 
and Yale—admissions processes: Cornell Law Review’s 2012–13 class comprised thirteen 
women out of forty-two total members (approximately 31% women), Notre Dame Law Review’s 
2012–13 class comprised nine women of out twenty-five total members (approximately 36% 
women), Stanford Law Review’s 2012–13 class comprised fifteen women  out of forty-four total 
members (approximately 34% women), and Yale Law Review’s 2012–13 class comprised twenty 
women out of fifty-four total members (approximately 37% women).  This evidence, though 
limited in scope, increases support for the conclusion that selection methodology does not make 
any definitive difference to the gender composition of law review membership. 
3. Affirmative Action and Additional Admissions Considerations 
 Several editors-in-chief shared with me explicitly that they either do or do not implement 
any affirmative action practices while selecting new members for their law reviews.  Among the 
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  See e-mail from Joseph Florczak, supra note 89. 
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law reviews that do practice some form of affirmative action, the practices vary widely, ranging 
from asking candidates to identify in a personal statement any characteristic or experience that 
might make them unique to reserving a certain number of seats in the class to be filled at the 
discretion of the senior editorial board or specially appointed diversity committee.   
 I could discern no clear pattern or relationship between these practices and the gender 
disparity in law review memberships.  Nonetheless, it may be the case that affirmative action 
practices are reducing formerly present gender disparities; a few editors-in-chief indicated to me 
that historical problems of minority underrepresentation on their law reviews were precisely 
what inspired their law reviews to adopt affirmative action practices.  The editor-in-chief of the 
New York University Law Review, for example, reported that in recent years, women generally 
only comprised one-third of the newest class while men comprised the other two-thirds, and this 
persistent underrepresentation of women played a major role in leading the New York University 
Law Review to reserve twelve out of fifty seats yearly for holistic review by a Diversity 
Committee that selects candidates based primarily on their resumes, personal statements, and a 
number of other factors, including gender. 
 Whether or not affirmative action practices effectively diversify law review membership 
is an entirely separate query from whether law reviews should implement affirmative action 
practices in an effort to diversify law review membership.  Indeed, even if a single selection 
method could be identified as the cause of gender disparity in law review membership, whether 
or not a law review should alter its admissions process to account for this is a normative question 
that lies properly in the hands of each law review’s editor-in-chief and editorial board.  Several 
law reviews, including the Stanford Law Review and Northwestern University Law Review, 
indicated that they do not practice any affirmative action because they desire to preserve the 
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complete anonymity of their admissions processes.  In lieu of affirmative action, these schools 
attempt to diversify their memberships by actively reaching out to their school’s affinity groups 
for underrepresented minorities, including women, to promote law review participation and 
explain admission requirements.  Notably, despite their rejection of affirmative action practices, 
neither the Stanford Law Review nor the Northwestern University Law Review display any 
statistically significant gender disparity. 
B. Importance 
Establishing from independently reported and verified data that a gender disparity exists 
in the memberships of the top twenty law reviews, especially viewing these law reviews as the 
models for the rest of the nation’s several hundred legal journals, adds support to the numerous 
scholarly arguments that women are less successful than men in law school.
93
  This finding may 
even reinforce arguments that women feel alienated from their law schools,
94
 especially in light 
of the fact that women appear to be underrepresented on law reviews that have very different 
selections criteria and admissions processes.   
 The gender disparity on law reviews is not only symbolic of the gender disparity in the 
legal profession as a whole, but it also likely bears a causal relationship to the greater gender 
disparity.  In an economic period in which many commentators argue that it is prohibitively 
expensive for students to attend anything but the nation’s top-ranked law schools (and some 
argue that attendance is not worthwhile even at those schools), being a member of law review is 
more important than ever.
95
  Therefore, if fewer women than men are members of law reviews, 
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  See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
94
  See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
95
  See Menachem Wecker, Law Review Leads To Legal Jobs, Recruiters Say, U.S. NEWS 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/articles/2012/01/19/law-review-leads-to-legal-jobs-recruiters-say. 
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then this means it is likely that fewer women than men are obtaining the most desirable legal 
jobs, and indeed, this is exactly what the most current data shows: there is a gender disparity 
among equity partners at top law firms, general counsels at Fortune 500 companies, and deans at 
law schools.
96
  Law review membership may also directly impact women’s additional 
opportunities to excel in law school, such as having their papers published.
97
  Law reviews are, 
for better or for worse, widely regarded as accurate barometers for an individual’s performance 
in a demanding job, especially at a prestigious law firm.
98
 
C. Explanations 
My research is not broad enough nor is my expertise great enough to begin to adequately  
address the myriad possible explanations for the observed gender disparity on the top twenty law 
reviews.  I therefore choose to focus my discussion in this Part on one key finding that my work 
does adequately cover: the persistent gender disparity among the top twenty law reviews is not 
experienced by each of these law reviews individually.  A gender disparity does not exist on 
every law review, and no particular selection method—including use of affirmative action 
practices—seems to be the single or even major cause of the overall gender disparity in law 
review membership.  This non-universality is significant because it suggests that the gender 
disparity, though its source remains elusive, is not inevitable.  This means that it may be entirely 
possible for law reviews to achieve gender parity if they wish to do so; indeed, it appears that 
several law reviews already have. 
 The non-universality of the gender disparity further raises the possibility that it is not the 
law review that is causing the disparity at all.  Rather than the gender disparity clearly resulting 
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  See CATALYST SURVEY, supra note 20. 
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  See Mullins & Leong, supra note 2, at 387. 
98
  See Wecker, supra note 95. 
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from a law review “grade-on” selection method, an inherently biased writing competition, or 
even solely from processes that reject affirmative action for women, it could simply be the case 
that women are affirmatively choosing to not join law reviews.   
 A woman might decline to apply for law review membership for any number of reasons.  
This choice could be the effect of women’s feelings of alienation from their law schools, the 
theory first suggested by Lani Guinier and endorsed by many scholars since then.  Alternatively, 
the disparity could be a result of women entering law school already at some disadvantage to 
their male counterparts.
99
  I suggest instead that women, rather than being unable to succeed in 
law school for any reason, simply choose to not succeed in law school by the conventional 
markers of success, such as law review membership.  It is not that women cannot make law 
review; it is rather that oftentimes they are not interested in doing so.
100
 
 A recent publication of the Law School Admissions Council included the following 
statements in summary of its empirical findings: 
The women in our sample reported being as satisfied with law 
school as the men; had opportunities to do some of the best jobs in 
the profession, including large firm practice, corporate counsel 
positions, and academic positions; enjoyed at least as much 
mentoring as the men; and expressed greater satisfaction with their 
careers and work–family balance. On the issue of child care, our 
                                                 
99
  For reasons not entirely understood, women generally enter law school with higher 
undergraduate GPAs but lower LSAT scores than their male counterparts.  See Richard K. 
Neumann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: A Statistical Update, 73 UMKC L. REV. 419, 421–22 
(2004).  If LSAT scores are generally accepted as better predictors of law school success than 
undergraduate GPAs, then this data could suggest that women are entering law school at a 
relative disadvantage to men. 
100
   This theory is not entirely novel.  Some scholars advance self-selection as a large 
part of the explanation for law review gender disparity, see, e.g., Leong, supra note 50Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 289 (“I believe . . . that women are affirmatively choosing not to try 
out for law review.”), while others reject this idea, see, e.g., Guinier et al., supra note 23, at 29 
(claiming that women apply to law review “at rates proportionate to their numbers in the Law 
School”); Bowers, supra note 51, at 154 (asserting that “women participate in the write-on 
competition at a level equal to or higher than their proportion in the class”). 
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data suggest that more men and women who want to perform child 
care are entering the profession and that they are taking 
significantly longer periods away from paid work to perform child 
care and working fewer hours each year. Unfortunately there is 
still a substantial price to pay for the opportunity to perform child 
care for both men and women in terms of a substantially reduced 
probability of being a partner and significantly reduced income.  
 
This summary effectively captures the tension between a woman’s potential for success in both 
her career and at home.  This tension does not arise only after a woman graduates from law 
school.  Instead, it manifests itself as early as the first year of law school, when the woman may 
affirmatively choose to spend more time than men on personal or family pursuits than on 
studying for exams or “writing on” to a law review. 
 This theory is consistent with numerous articles and opinion pieces over the past few 
months, from Anne-Marie Slaughter’s “Why Women Still Can’t Have It All” to Sheryl 
Sandberg’s Lean In, arguing that contemporary professional culture is leading even ambitious 
modern American women to actively decline positions of traditional prestige, success, and 
power.
101
  The basic reason for this trend is that even talented, career-driven women have 
interests and responsibilities that compete with or trump their professional goals, and the infinite 
nature of time requires the making of choices, priorities, and compromises.  Although this can be 
equally true for both women and men, societal and cultural expectations pressure women to 
make these types of choices even while similarly situated men do not have to.
 102
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  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 
(July/August 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-
cant-have-it-all/309020/; SHERYL SANDBERG, Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead 
(2013). 
102
  See Slaughter, supra note 101 (“[W]omen [who] planned to combine careers and 
family in some way . . . almost all assumed and accepted that they would have to make 
compromises that the men in their lives were far less likely to have to make.”); see also Kenneth 
G. Dau-Schmidt, et al., GENDER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE MICHIGAN ALUMNI DATA SET 
1967–2000, LSAC RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 2 (March 2008) (“In undertaking a legal career, 
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 Women law students are no different than their professional counterparts in the sense that 
these women may decline to seek positions of traditional prestige, success, and power—such as 
law review membership—because they often have interests and responsibilities they find more 
compelling than the law school rat race.  Law review inarguably swallows an enormous amount 
of a law student’s time; indeed, it is this very characteristic that makes law review membership 
such an attractive resume item for law firm recruiters because “large law firms are looking for 
students who are willing to work between 80 and 100 hours a week without complaint.”103  This 
is valuable time that a woman law student could alternatively devote to her relationship with her 
partner, her children, her home, or simply her personal hobbies and interests.   
 A common reward for doing well in law school is law review membership, which entails 
a significant load of additional work, and the reward for doing well on law review is often a 
prestigious legal job, which entails even more work than that.  This is a cycle that begins early 
and could well never end without students and young attorneys affirmatively choosing to end it.  
Whether it is a force of biology, psychology, sociology, or historical male dominance, women 
are apparently much more willing than men to affirmatively end that cycle.
104
 
 Because I did not ask law reviews how many women applied for membership, my study 
does not clearly reveal whether or not women are affirmatively self-selecting out of the law 
                                                                                                                                                             
both men and women have to choose where to situate themselves in dedicating hours and effort 
to child care or to their career. . . . Of course this ‘choice’ . . .  [is] greatly constrained by 
personal characteristics, the expectations of mates, and social norms for behavior.”). 
103
  Wecker, supra note 96 (“Most law students spend 40 to 50 hours a week attending 
class and studying, and law review typically adds another 20 hours a week. ‘That’s precisely 
what large law firms are looking for: smart workhorses,’ [a New York City attorney who runs his 
own firm] says.”). 
104
  See Kay S. Hymowitz, The Plight of the Alpha Female, CITY JOURNAL (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.city-journal.org/2012/22_4_alpha-female.html. 
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review selection process.
105
  Even if women are not directly self-selecting out of the application 
process, however, they may still be indirectly self-selecting out by spending relatively little time 
studying or completing the writing competition, either of which would likely result in lower 
grades and writing scores (and, consequently, lower chances of securing law review membership 
offers).  Rather than it being the case that women are disfavored by the Socratic method,
106
 need 
more female role models on the law school faculty,
107
 or just do not have the assertive 
personalities and presence that they need in order to be successful attorneys,
108
 it may simply be 
the case that, like their professional counterparts, women law students are less inclined than their 
male counterparts to sacrifice family and outside interests for power and status.
109
   
 Simultaneously displaying both an ability to fully succeed in a historically male-
dominated world and a general unwillingness to forego other obligations and interests—
especially those that are familial—is not a characteristic exclusive to women in the legal 
profession.  Women now dominate a number of professional industries traditionally perceived as 
typically male-dominated, including accounting, financial management, and medical science.
110
  
Ironically, much of the reason for this may be that these typically male-dominated professions 
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  Although I did not request it, several editors indicated in their responses to me that 
their law reviews do not even record this information, let alone release it. 
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  See ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE 
EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1996); see also Guinier et al., supra note 24, at 
3–4. 
107
  See Felice Batlan, et al., Not Our Mother’s Law School?: A Third-Wave Feminist 
Study of Women’s Experiences in Law School, 39 U. BALT. L. F. 124, 147–48 (Spring 2009). 
108
  See Tracy L. Wareing, Issues Facing Women Lawyers Entering The Legal Profession, 
36-NOV ARIZ. ATT’Y 42, 42 (Nov. 1999). 
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  See Hymowitz, supra note 103. 
110
  See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WOMEN’S BUREAU, DATA AND STATISTICS, 2009.  
http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/stats_data.htm. 
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are allowing more flexible, innovative scheduling options that appeal to parents.
111
  Law school, 
too, may be following this path: though law school was traditionally closed to women entirely, 
women now attend law school in numbers almost equal to men.
112
  Like numerous other pursuits, 
from suffrage to military combat, women have proven that they can succeed in the previously 
male-dominated law school and the legal profession. 
 The understanding that women can succeed in law school to the same extent as men has 
enormous implications for potential reform efforts.  Calling for change to the system may send 
the mistaken message that women cannot withstand the rigors of the law school system.
113
  
Worse yet, failing to recognize the multitude of women’s successes in law school throughout the 
past few decades may prevent women’s continuing advancement in the legal profession by 
sending a message that women are incapable of attaining successes that they are, in reality, 
already attaining.  Rather than reforming schools to accommodate women’s “timidity and 
delicacy,” we should instead focus on efforts to promote understanding of the difficult choices 
women face and the ways that men can assist women in better balancing work and family 
obligations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
My goal in this Note was to provide the first comprehensive statistical analysis of  
independently reported and verified data on law review membership in order to determine 
whether or not a gender disparity exists on law reviews.  I further hoped that this analysis would 
indicate whether any given admissions process correlates particularly strongly with that gender 
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  See Jenna Goudreau, 20 Surprising Jobs Women Are Taking Over, FORBES 
MAGAZINE (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jennagoudreau/2011/03/07/20-
surprising-jobs-women-are-taking-over/. 
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  See supra discussion Part I.B. 
113
  See Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic Method and Women Law Students: Humanize, 
Don’t Feminize, 7 S. CAL. L. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 37, 39–40 (Fall 1997).  
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disparity.  Interestingly, no single selection method or even combination of selection methods 
appears to consistently yield any greater number of women than men; some law reviews with 
similar admissions processes have very different membership compositions by gender, and some 
law reviews with very different admissions processes have very similar membership 
compositions by gender.  
One might interpret this as a rather bleak picture of women’s law review participation 
showing that no matter what a law review does, women will still have a more difficult time 
becoming members than men.  I prefer instead to emphasize the non-universality of the gender 
disparity and suggest that the fact that seven of the twenty law reviews I studied did not display a 
significant gender disparity continues a positive narrative about women’s increasing participation 
in law schools and the legal profession. 
 To further test my theory that the gender disparity (where it exists) marks women’s 
unwillingness to participate rather than any systematic disadvantage in law school or the law 
review admissions process, it would be helpful to broaden future studies to reach more law 
reviews and inquire whether each of these schools have part-time programs or other flexible 
scheduling that might appeal to women with families.  Furthermore, it would be interesting to 
study whether there is any connection between the median age of a law school population or law 
review membership and participation in the school’s activities or law review.   
 Because there are any number of explanations for why women might be affirmatively 
opting out of law school or law review participation, this is a difficult concept to quantify.  I 
posit only that women are, as evidenced by the seven out of top twenty law reviews with no 
gender disparity in their membership, entirely able to succeed in law school and gain law review 
membership.  The gender disparity that does remain may very well be a result of women 
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affirmatively choosing not to participate in law reviews.  This, in turn, could be a function of a 
school’s writing competition demands,114 or the school’s culture more generally. 
 My hope now is that the work I have done for this Note will add to and stimulate the 
ongoing inquiry into women’s experiences in law school.  There are countless possibilities for 
future studies that build upon my own by encompassing a broader scope of years, schools, or 
both, or by delving more deeply into possible causes of the gender disparity by attempting to 
identify finer differences between law review admissions processes.  Future studies could obtain 
a more accurate picture of law review gender disparity by comparing the gender composition of 
each law review’s membership with the exact numbers of men and women who applied to each 
law review during each year.  In addition to improving the accuracy of my general findings, 
these future studies would be much better able to address self-selection as a possible explanation 
for any law review gender disparity that exists. 
 I strongly encourage law schools that do not currently track gender composition to begin 
to do so, and I also encourage law schools that track but withhold this information to strongly 
consider releasing it publicly for the benefit of all law reviews and the legal profession as a 
whole.  Without understanding exactly why women are dramatically underrepresented on some 
law reviews but not at all underrepresented on others, it is difficult to determine both whether the 
problem can be remedied and, more importantly, whether it even should be. 
                                                 
114
  The format, content, and style of writing competitions vary widely.  Some schools, 
such as the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Virginia, administer a writing 
competition that lasts over only a weekend or a full day.  Other schools administer a writing 
competition that can take up to one or two weeks to complete, which might naturally tend to 
favor students with fewer commitments outside of law school. 
